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SENSE OF HUMOR AS A CHRISTIAN VIRTUE
Robert C. Roberts

Puritanism has been defined as the fear that somewhere out there somebody
is having fun. John Morreall has argued that a sense of humor is incompatible
with Christian belief. I The sight of Christians frolicking about like children
at recess inclines some to think the Christians are finally becoming human.
Such people have probably not read Chesterton or been to a Young Life
meeting. Inside the Christian camp, we are often told (and for some reason
we keep needing to be reminded) that Christianity is not a sour philosophy.
Life is a matter of life-and-death, it is true, and Christians have responsibilities; but also they can play and laugh; faith is (or should be) a liberation
from despair and grief and guilt, a life of thanksgiving and joyful service.
Sometimes, in this context, we are told that Christians should have a sense
of humor. S"ren Kierkegaard even goes so far as to call Christianity "the
most humorous view of life in world history."2 How does a sense of humor
especially fit one for life as a Christian? What is there about Christianity that
makes it especially hospitable to a sense of humor?
The first approach that occurs to us is to list some Christian "values" that
a sense of humor can achieve. Christianity is a religion of joy, and amusement
is enjoyable; ergo, Christians should endorse amusement. Christianity is pro
health and healing, and laughter is at least as good for you as jogging and
Brussels sprouts. (We think of Norman Cousins getting healed by yukking it
up over Charley Chaplin.) A sense of humor about ourselves can liberate us
from narcissism and depression and self-pity and other evils, giving us a
healthy "objectivity" about ourselves. This in tum makes us better companions: and good communal life is, after all, an important Christian value.
I think we can do better than talk vaguely of Christian "values" and of how
humor, also vaguely conceived, fosters these. We all know about spiritually
dubious senses of humor: Humor can be malicious, racist, sacrilegious, sexist,
"sick," silly and trivial; and we might suspect that people who enjoy these
in a big way tend to be malicious, racist, sacrilegious, sexist, "sick," silly and
trivial people. If a sense of humor is a Christian virtue, it should have some
special features in consequence of its fitting into the Christian personality.3
On the other hand, Christian amusement will also have some features that all
amusement has.
I shall look at five characteristics of amusement and ask what implications
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the Christian life has, with respect to each feature, for the shape of a Christian
sense of humor. The five characteristics of amusement that I'll examine are
1) perception of incongruity, 2) perspectivity, 3) dissociation, 4) freshness,
and 5) enjoyment. A distinctively Christian sense of humor is one that is
shaped by the Christian narratives and their concepts. Two of its characteristics in particular justify regarding it as a virtue4 alongside such other Christian virtues as gratitude, hope, and compassion. First, it is a capacity for
"vision" or "perception" of Christianly important incongruities in oneself and
others; as such it is a form of Christian discernment and supports whatever
other Christian virtues depend on such discernment. Second, when directed
towards oneself, a Christian sense of humor is a form of humility. While
virtually any morality might generate a distinctive sense of humor, Christian
theology/psychology is especially prone to this because it promotes a dissociation between one's actual character and one's true character. I shall also
point out how humor forms a natural bridge to Christianity for many non-believers and half-hearted Christians and how, typical of virtues, a Christian
sense of humor cannot be a virtue unless it is allied with other traits.
1. Perception of Incongruity

It is fairly widely acknowledged among philosophers of humor that amusement' occurs characteristically in response to perception of incongruities, that
is, the construal of something in terms of something else that fits oddly.
There are competing views, such as Hobbes's "superiority" theory and
Freud's "relief" theory, but I think that John Morreall has adequately answered them, and will not here go into the debate myself.6 To have a sense
of humor is to be especially prone to perceive incongruities of one sort or
another. It is the business of the humorist to present his or her material in
such a way that the incongruities become vivid. To this end the humorist is
an artist in the management of vocabulary, vocal inflection, set-up, timing,
facial expression, bodily posture, and whatever else it takes. Just about any
kind of incongruity can be funny, as long as it captures people's interest and
is not too painful. Funny incongruities almost invariably have some connection with human life, because that is what interests us most.
The antics of chimpanzees are comical to us because they look at once
human and non-human. To see them as funny is almost invariably to see them
as pseudo-humans; if we see them simply as normal chimpanzees (something
difficult to do on short acquaintance), they do not look funny to us. Caricatures are funny because they both look like their subject and yet exaggerate
.certain features incongruously; through exaggerating features that are already
somewhat incongruous, the good caricaturist brings out what is comical (that
is, incongruous) in the subject himself. My brother used to speak fluent
German with a perfect hick-Kansas accent; it was practically unintelligible
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to Germans, but to those who knew both German and hick-Kansas the effect
was hilarious. This also functions as a caricature of some Americans speaking
German. Erma Bombeck's title "I Lost Everything in the Post-Natal Depression," like other puns, is funny by virtue of suggesting, by context, an incongruous sense of a word. When one philosopher diagnoses another as suffering
from "hardening of the categories," the utterance is comical because of the
incongruous application of the medical vocabulary to a non-medical context
(produced by the similarity of sound between "category" and "artery"), with
the suggestion that categorial rigidity is a sort of disease. When Oscar Wilde
says "Life is much too important to be taken seriously," this true comment
on the impropriety of lugubriousness is funny because it seems to contradict
the truism that important things are the ones that ought to be taken seriously.
What has this to do with Christianity? While all the above can be "good
clean fun," and are certainly not incompatible with Christianity, there is
nothing essentially Christian about them. (In the appropriate setting the quip
from Wilde and the philosophical joke might be placed in the service of
Christian insight, but the setting would have to provide what was distinctively
Christian.) But Christianity is a perspective from which certain important
incongruities become visible. One Christian type of comic perception is exemplified in a passage from Thomas Merton, who reports that Buggy Jerwood, chaplain of Oakham school in Merton's time, used to preach on I Cor.
13, confusing a Christian concept.
The boys listened tolerantly to these thoughts. But I think St Peter and the
twelve Apostles would have been rather surprised at the concept that Christ
had been scourged and beaten by soldiers, cursed and crowned with thorns
and subjected to unutterable contempt and finally nailed to the Cross and left
to bleed to death in order that we might all become gentlemen.'

Merton notes that "the boys listened tolerantly to these thoughts." Presumably
none of them found Mr. Jerwood's sermons amusing in the way that Merton
did at the time of writing. And the reason, probably, was that they were not
sufficiently developed as Christians for the distinction between behaving like
a gentleman and exemplifying Christian love to be salient for them. As a
consequence, they did not perceive the ludicrousness of someone's preaching
mere gentlemanliness from a Christian pulpit and in the Christian vocabulary.
Merton brings out the humor in this by sharply juxtaposing the incongruous
pair: the pathos of the Christian salvation story and the concept of a gentleman. It is to the credit of Merton's Christian discernment that he now finds
the spectacle of Mr. Jerwood's preaching amusing, and to the credit of his
skill as a humorist that he can amuse us with what amuses him. Whatever we
might want to say about Merton's capacity to be amused by puns from
Bombeck and quips from Wilde, it seems clear that his capacity to be amused
by the likes of Mr. Jerwood is something very much like a Christian vi(tue.
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It is a form of discernment conditioned by the Christian story and its catego-

ries. But it is more than an "intellectual" discernment; it is a kind of perception (see section 4 below).
The incongruity in the behavior of Buggy Jerwood is just one instance of
an endless supply of incongruities in human action and demeanor which
become visible to one who looks upon the world with Christian eyes. The
sight of kings and presidents and corporate executives and university professors strutting about as though they are indispensable to the well-being of the
human race becomes laughable when projected against the vision of a sovereign God who gives and takes power as he will, and by whose grace alone
those live who live. The very concept of a "moral majority" is a scream when
seen from the perspective of a people whose history is that of at most a sinful
but believing minority. The sight of myself trying to make my life completely
safe with insurance policies and check-ups and retirement systems and health
food and jogging becomes ridiculous if I acknowledge that I am like the
withering grass and that God alone is the source of my security. On someone
who feels self-righteous because he gives 15% of his gross income to charity
a ludicrous light is cast by considering that he is not an owner, but only a
steward of it anyway. If I believe that whatever I possess I have because God
has welcomed me into his family, then I satirize myself if I try to gain
importance by becoming very learned and having a fat list of publications.
And so on.
To become a Christian is to inherit the wherewithal for an exponential
increase in the number of important incongruities one can see, and thus for
comical impressions of the "world." Perhaps this explains in part why
Kierkegaard called Christianity "the most humorous view of life in worldhistory."
The above characterizations may fail to strike someone as funny, and if
they do fail, it is worth asking why. I can think of two possible explanations.
One is that I am not a very good humorist, and so have not presented them
in such a way as to make vivid the incongruities I mention. To do so really
well would require artistry, and probably also more verbal space than the
one-liners I have devoted to them. The other possibility is that the person
fails to find them funny because he doesn't have a taste for that kind of
humor-after all, there are people who don't have a taste for sick humor,
black humor, racist humor, or whatnot. Surely there are people who just lack
a taste for Christian humor. What would it be to lack a taste for this kind of
humor? This question leads to a discussion of the second major characteristic
of humor.

2. Perspectivity
My discussion of incongruity has assumed that perception of incongruity is
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not just a function of the eyeballs, so to speak, but is a mental event of "perceiving" one thing in terms of another,· two things that fit oddly together. In each
of my illustrations of Christian humor, the incongruity is between a piece of
what we might call "pagan" behavior, thought, or emotion, and a distinctively
Christian view of things. In Christian humor the Christian view of things is taken
to be "normal," and the "pagan" behavior, thought, or emotion appears laughable, ludicrous, ridiculous, etc., from this perspective. It is equally possible, and
has of course often happened, that the order of the incongruity is reversed, and
that what is distinctively Christian looks weird, odd, incongruous, bizarre, absurd, laughable, etc., from the "pagan" perspective.
A sense for the normal is basic to any sense of humor. You won't find
anything funny if you don't consider anything to be normal, and this sense
for the normal is what constitutes a person's perspective. But I think we can
go a little deeper than this, and ask what sort of thing this sense for the normal
is. The traditional Christian may answer that it is Christian beliefs-beliefs
in the sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of man, the doctrine of grace, the
stewardship of man, the kingdom of God-that provide this sense of the
normal which is at the basis of Christian amusement.
But this response is given the lie by a look at some examples of more
everyday humor. Many pieces of humor are funny only from the perspective
of someone who speaks a given language. Take for example Erma Bombeck's
title that I mentioned earlier: "I Lost Everything in the Post-Natal Depression." The sense of the normal required for appreciating this joke is a sense
for two meanings of 'depression': depression as a mood that frequently comes
over new mothers, and depression as a period of economic world history in
which many people lost everything. Any language that does not possess just
this ambiguity in one of its terms will not make a very good translation of
this joke. If you try to explain this joke to a foreigner who does not speak
English very well, it is unlikely that she will be struck with the full force of
it. If you tell her that in our language 'depression' has these two meanings,
she will be able to see that there is something funny here, that the natives
laugh at. But unless she has extraordinary powers of linguistic empathy, she
will not be struck by this joke the way a native speaker is. The reason is that
she lacks what I am calling the sense of the normal from which vantage point
this line appears incongruous. But obviously the sense of the normal here is
not provided by the belief that the word 'depression' has such-and-such
meanings. The foreigner believes that as well as the native speaker. The
difference between them is rather that the native speaker has a "feel" for the
word which allows him to be struck by the incongruity of its being used in
these two very different senses at the same time. This has little to do with
believing something about the word, and a lot to do with having lived in the
language for a while. By analogy one might suggest that the sense of the
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normal required for Christian humor is less a function of Christian beliefs,
and more a function of a "feel" for. the Christian categories. Some believers
might be deficient in this "feel," while some unbelievers might have it, and
in both cases the "feel" (or lack thereof) will result from how people have
lived, in a very broad sense of 'lived.'
One might object that it isn't fair to argue from cases of silly pun-humor to
cases of Christian humor. Maybe the perspective from which puns are appreciated is no belief, but it doesn't follow that Christian amusement is not
founded on beliefs. Against this objection, however, is a simple observation
of religious fact: that some people who believe in the sovereignty of God, the
kingdom of God, the sinfulness of man, and so forth, do not have much in the
way of a Christian sense of humor; and that some people who do not believe
in these things, but do have a "feel" for Christianity, are capable of appreciating Christian humor when it is presented to them. Of course, the solidest
mooring in the Christian "sense for the normal" would be to have the Christian
beliefs, and also to "live" in these so thoroughly that one effortlessly sees the
incongruities they make visible. But the beliefs are neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for seeing the Christian incongruities. 9
I propose to distinguish between having a perspective, owning a perspective, and adopting a perspective. I use each of these expressions in a somewhat contrived sense. By 'adopt a perspective' I mean to make it, or allow
it to be, operative in one's perception; but I do not want to stress the activity
of making or allowing. In my sense of this word we adopt a perspective
whenever it is activated in us, whether or not by consent. Thus in this sense
we are adopting the perspective of English when amused by the title from
Bombeck; we are adopting a "human" perspective when amused by the antics
of some chimpanzees; we are adopting the perspectives of both American
English and German when we laugh at someone speaking German with a
hick-Kansas accent, etc.
To have a perspective, on the other hand, is to be capable of adopting it;
it is for that perspective to be available or accessible. To speak English is to
have the perspective needed to appreciate the Bombeck title, but I may not,
at some moment, be adopting that perspective, because I may be asleep or
appreciating a Dutch pun. The perspective provided by my knowing English
is not at the moment "engaged," so to speak. A person who has more than a
zoo-trip acquaintance with chimpanzees may not always see them as pseudo
humans, at which times she will not be adopting the perspective which makes
them appear funny. But such a person may not have lost her capacity to see
them from that perspective, and so she can be said to have that perspective,
even if she does not adopt it very much. A person like this may be able,
within certain limits, to adopt the perspective in question at will. For example,
when she is working with her chimpanzees day-to-day they appear quite

HUMOR AS A CHRISTIAN VIRTUE

183

"nonnal" to her, but when visitors come and point out the pseudo human
character of some behavior, she is able to join them in taking again the
"human" perspective, and thus in seeing the incongruity and being amused.
If she has some interest in the psychology of aspect-switch, she may even sit
in her chimp lab practicing switching back and forth between the "human"
perspective and the other.
A person owns a perspective when that perspective is natural and habitual,
when he not only can adopt it, but fairly strongly tends to do so. If one speaks
English well, one automatically owns the sense of the nonnal necessary to
appreciate Bombeck's title. A person who grows in acquaintance with chimpanzees will gradually cease to own the perspective from which they appear
(in the typical way) incongruous, even if she does not cease to have this
perspective. Their behavior will come to seem nonnal, and not just the human
behavior of which theirs reminds us.
We can now distinguish among kinds of people with respect to a Christian
sense of humor. There will be people who do not have the Christian sense of
the nonnal, people who have it but do not own it, and people who own it.
The first group do not have a Christian sense of humor at all. We may be
able to make them understand ("intellectually") why others find the remark
from Merton funny, but they will not themselves find it funny. The second
group are persons who would probably not on their own detect the humor in
the concept of a moral majority, because they would not adopt the perspective, but once the incongruity is pointed out to them, especially by an able
humorist, they adopt the perspective and are amused. The third group are
ones for whom the Christian sense of the normal is so natural that they
spontaneously or "primitively" perceive the incongruity of, say, feeling selfrighteous·for giving away 15% of one's income or of trying to secure one's
life through insurance and check-ups. It seems obvious that the people in the
third group are the ones who have most thoroughly imbibed Christianity.
Their sense of humor is "deeply" Christian, and has every right, it seems to
me, to be called a Christian virtue.
But it is the second group to which most of us belong, whether we are
Christians or not. We are not so thoroughly and primitively entrenched in the
Christian perspective that we spontaneously generate Christian amusement,
but the perspective is more or less available to us, so we can "get into it"
enough to be amused when a Merton or a Kierkegaard or a Chesterton points
out the relevant incongruities. If we sit down and make the effort, we may
even be able, rather unspontaneously, to construct a bit of Christian humor
ourselves.
It seems to me very significant that one can adopt the Christian perspective
without owning it. This means that Christian humor is accessible to a wider
audience than that of Christian saints. It is accessible to halfway Christians
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like most of us in the pews, as well as to persons with no commitment
whatsoever to Christianity, provided that they have enough empathic imagination, experience of life, training in cognate world-views, or whatever it
takes, to be able to adopt this perspective which is not properly theirs. Christian humor is thus a window on Christianity for those who are not fully
Christians, in exactly the way that malicious humor is a window on malice
for those who are not committed to malice. It is an access to virtues and vices
that are not ours, a way of transcending our own character. In the previous
section I claimed that a Christian sense of humor is a virtue because it is a
form of vision or Christian discernment. The present section has led us to see
the capacity for being amused by Christian humor (and this is less than a
fully saintly sense of humor) as a form of freedom or potential for self-transcendence toward the things of the Spirit. This is not a Christian virtue, but
we might call it a quasi-virtue, or a virtue potential. It is certainly a stage on
the way to fully Christian virtues.
Laughing from an alien perspective is not merely an exercise of the imagination, as it were, but something closer to a genuine participation in the
Christian perspective. To understand this, and its ethical significance, we
must explore the remaining dimensions of amusement.

3. Dissociation
When I find something humorous, I dissociate myself from it, even if what
I am laughing at is my friend, my children, my lover, or myself. Dissociation
is determined by the two facts about amusement that I have just expounded:
that it is a perception of incongruity from a perspective which is a sense for
the normal. To see the chimpanzees' antics as incongruous is to see them as
something different from my "own," those of my own kind. To laugh at
someone speaking German with a hick-Kansas accent is to say, as it were, "I
know that's not how it's really done." If we laugh at Oscar Wilde's remark
that "life is much too important to be taken seriously," it is because we do
not take it seriously-not, that is, as a literal formula for the truth it expresses.
To laugh at Buggy lerwood's confusion of (X'Yeut'1 and gentlemanliness implies that we view that confusion as alien to our own minds. To be amused
is not to dissociate myself from everything about the "object" of amqsement.
The chimpanzees may be cherished pets, and Buggy lerwood may be my best
friend; and I may acknowledge truth in Wilde's wild remarks. When I laugh
at myself, I certainly do not experience complete self-alienation. But I do
dissociate myself from what I perceive to be incongruous; this follows from
the concept of seeing something as incongruous.
This fact is significant for our analysis. For it means that when I laugh as
a Christian (whether or not I am one) I "see," at least for the moment, the
pagan perspective as alien. This is natural enough in the case where the
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laugher at Christian humor is a Christian; it is natural for her to be dissociated
from the pagan sense of the normal. But this dissociation becomes interesting
where the laugher at Christian humor is not a Christian, or is that partial sort
of Christian that most Christians are-one for whom the Christian sense of
the normal, though accessible, is not very natural. When one is amused at
something that normally seems normal, one is getting a striking glimpse of
"another world." Christian humor is, you might say, on the borderline between
Christianity and "paganism." For you don't have to be a Christian to enjoy it,
and yet to enjoy it is to dissociate yourself, at least momentarily, from your
habitual non-Christian perspective. Thus among pagans (whether or not they
are church-going) Christian humor is a destabilizing influence.
Let us imagine that Merton was able to get Buggy lerwood laughing, along
with the rest of us, at his confusion. This would take some finesse, preciseiy
because humor is dissociative. When somebody else laughs at us, we know
that he is not 100% "with" us-unless, of course, we are laughing at ourselves
and thus laughing with him, in which case we are not 100% "with" ourselves,
either. We feel that laughter directed at us, even if completely lacking in scorn
or derision or contempt, alienates us from the laugher. We feel pushed away,
set apart as something that doesn't belong; and we want to belong. So we don't
like being laughed at, and a humorist who sets out, in the interest of Christianity,
to dissociate pagans from their paganism, will need to employ a subtle art.
One way will be to communicate as much as possible to Buggy that he is
being laughed at as a friend, as one to whom we are bound with the bonds
of affection. This mitigates his sense of alienation from the humorist, making
it easier for him to accept the alienation from his own viewpoint, and thus to
start laughing at himself. The less the humor sounds like sarcasm, and the
more like friendly fun, the better. Another strategy is to get him laughing,
not directly at himself, but at somebody like himself. For those of us who
have preached lerwoodish sermons from time to time, it is easier to laugh at
Buggy than to laugh at ourselves, and yet laughing at Buggy can serve a
similar purpose: of dissociating us from the practice of making lerwoodish
sermons. The Archie Bunker Show represented Archie's racial and ethnic
bigotry in a consistently comic light, and thus served the moral purpose of
dissociating bigots from their bigotry by the complicity of their own laughter.
I am sure the laughter (and the associated dissociation) came more easily for
Archie's having played the scapegoat, than it would have if each of those
bigots out there on the end of a boobtube were subjected, individually, to
comic ridicule.
But some people are able to laugh at their own foibles without the mitigation of deflecting the laughter against a scapegoat. They are less "defensive,"
better able to tolerate being represented as incongruous, because they have a
kind of dissociation built into their character-structure. Since they do not
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entirely "identify" with the ridiculous side of them, they are more or less
comfortable with being ridiculous. In many virtues-systems, there is no systematic conceptual resource for this dissociation (think of Aristotle, stoicism,
secular humanism); the individual's sense of his own identity as a person just
is more or less his sense of whatever his character is. So if he is to have the
self-confidence to laugh at momentous aspects of his own behavior and character, it must be on the basis of either deception (maybe self-deception) or
of some personal achievement by comparison with which the incongruities
seem to him less significant.
But this is not so in Christianity. Christian psychology, as per the Apostle
Paul, strongly promotes dissociation from even the most momentous aspects
of our character, thus opening the way for a sense of humor as a Christian
virtue. For the Christian scheme acknowledges forthrightly that people (all
people) are incongruous with their telos (and you won't find a more momentous incongruity than that.'), while at the same time those who believe in
Christ are justified, reborn, have a new nature, etc., which is not thus incongruous. Here we have, as it were, two identities: we are what our character
is, but beyond this and preeminently we are what God deems us to be and
destines us to be; and God's deeming and destining are gracious in Christ.
We are sinners, but at the same time righteous by Christ's identifying with
us and dwelling in us. We live by his sustaining grace, and not by our own
strength. When this dissociation of our true identity from our foible-identity
is deeply actualized in the individual personality, it emerges as humility. For
humility is the power to be happy and "self"-confident IO despite some form
or other of deficiency, inferiority, or defect. If "deep" humor has mostly to
do with human defect-with a person's incongruity respecting his or her telos
as human-then it would seem that humility goes hand in hand with a sense
of humor about oneself. The Christian theme of dissociation in the "spiritual"
person is surely another justification for Kierkegaard's comment that Christianity is the most humorous view of life in world-history. The Christian way
of conceiving persons allows, in a specially felicitous way, for that humility
without which a person cannot direct important humor against himself. On
the other hand, amusement at one's own foibles is an especially powerful
form of self-dissociation, and thus of humility. If a Christian sense of humor
is a capacity for seeing spiritual incongruities with one's own eyes, and it is
important to be able to see those incongruities not just in the "world," but in
oneself, then a Christian sense of humor is a deep form of self-knowledge
and surely, thus, a Christian virtue.

4. Freshness
To be amused by something is to be struck with some incongruity respecting it. When amused by the antics of the chimpanzees, I see the incongruity
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in their behavior. This is to be sharply contrasted with merely believing or
judging that their behavior differs in specific ways from that of humans, or
even knowing this. I can come to know how their behavior differs by reading
a scientific book on chimpanzee behavior, but this is quite different from the
appreciation of the incongruity involved in amusement, which is a direct
(though of course perspectival) perception. We can imagine someone reading
scientific books on the subject for fifty years, without in this very human way
experiencing the contrast between chimpanzees and humans. Of course the
scientific approach is in some ways superior to being amused by chimpanzees: I may be amused without being very articulate about the differences,
or having any explanation of them, and the scientific book may be just what
I need to become articulate and explanatory. And the two may be combined:
Scientific investigation may give saliency to differences which in their turn
become amusing, and amusement might provoke scientific investigation.
I use the word 'freshness' for this dimension of amusement because it
comes out most clearly in cases where (because of its absence) we are inclined
to say that the humor has gone "stale" for a person. Good jokes have staying
power, but I suppose any piece of humor can go stale if repeated enough. If
I repeat "Life is much too important to be taken seriously" 100 times a week
in various contexts, it is likely to lose its punch for me after a while. The
theory of humor that I am offering explains this loss of freshness as a loss of
perspective. Wilde's unorthodox use of the word 'seriously' begins to sound
normal, and so the perception of incongruity disappears. It is not that I have
ceased to know or believe or judge that this use of the word is incongruous,
for if asked I can certainly explain why other people are laughing at it; but
I have ceased to hear it as incongruous, and so have ceased being amused
myself. Of course there are ways that my sensitivity to the humor may be
resurrected even after death by repetition. In particular it is effective to share
the humor with someone who can really appreciate it; it is as though by
empathy with my hearer I am freshly reestablished in the needed perspective.
My point in this section is just that amusement has this character of perception: to be amused is to "hear" for oneself, to "see" for oneself, some incongruity or other.
Christian amusement too is a vision of the incongruities in human behavior,
taking the Christian perspective. Flannery O'Connor's very funny and deeply
Christian story "Revelation"l1 is not only about a "revelation" of sinfulness
and fundamental human equality to the bigoted and self-satisfied Mrs. Turpin;
it is also a "revelation" to the reader who is amused at Mrs. Turpin's complacent gratitude to Jesus for making her just who she is, neither white trash
nor a nigger nor bad-dispositioned nor ugly, but instead a woman with a little
of everything. In his amusement at Mrs. Turpin the reader sees the incongruity of her bigotry and self-satisfaction. Insofar as such Christian virtues as
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compassion, contrition, gratitude, hope, and humility presuppose (or at least
are fostered by) the ability to see the incongruity in bigotry and conceit (and
not just the belief or knowledge that these are incongruous), amusement at
Mrs. Turpin functions as an exercise in Christian virtues.
In the section on perspectivity I pointed out that we can be amused by
humor whose sense of the normal is not properly our "own." This means that
humor is an access to other perspectives, as long as they are not too distant
from one's own: non-sadists can enjoy sadistic humor, non-racists can enjoy
racist humor, non-Aristotelians can enjoy Aristotelian humor, non-Christians
can enjoy Christian humor. At the end of that section I commented that
laughing from an alien perspective is not merely an intellectual exercise, but
something nearer to a genuine participation in that perspective. Our discussion of freshness puts us in a position to appreciate this point. For the participation that I spoke of there can now be seen to be a deeply sympathetic
"perception." To be amused by O'Connor's story12 is to put on, for the
moment, Christian eyes and something like a Christian heart. I am not, of
course, saying that everyone who properly laughs at O'Connor's story has
the Christian virtue of a sense of humor; for that, presumably, one has to be
a fairly highly developed Christian. But O'Connor's power as a humorist is
her ability to enable us to visit the Christian perspective which to her, I
suspect, is native territory and the basis of her Christian sense of humor.

5. Enjoyment
Of the five features of amusement around which I have organized this
essay, I left the most obvious to the last. Amusement is pleasurable. I have
two things to say about this.
The moral significance of this fact is that humor draws or seduces us. When
we laugh at Mrs. Turpin we dissociate ourselves from her, and consequently
from that perspective in which it is quite normal to congratulate ourselves on
being less trashy and stupid, and more civilized and compassionate and sophisticated, than some other people that we daily meet. If Mrs. Turpin's, rather
than the Christian perspective, is our "own" (and I'd guess it probably is), this
dissociation will be painful and something we probably won't volunteer for.
And yet we gobble up the story like ice cream, subjecting ourselves to a
disturbing alien vision and the frightening possibility of sanctification. This is
what I mean by ·seduction,' and it is a great moral power of moral humor. It
is equally, I might add, a great power of immoral humor.
Throughout this paper a worry may have nagged the reader's mind. It is no
doubt an error to exclude all fun from the Christian life, but the kind of fun
that I have claimed for a sense of humor as a Christian virtue seems to be
especially perverse. For I have claimed that a sense of humor is a disposition
to enjoy some range of incongruities, and that a Christian sense of humor is
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especially a disposition to enjoy spiritual incongruities-incongruities between
a person's nature as a child of the gospel on the one hand, and his attitudes and
behavior on the other. Buggy Jerwood and Mrs. Turpin are comic figures because
of their failure in one respect or another as children of God. Can one possibly
be displaying a Christian virtue in laughing at that sort of thing?
The answer to this question lies in applying the "unity of the virtues" thesis.
In its stronger form, this thesis claims that a person cannot have one virtue
without having all of them. In a weaker form, it claims that some traits cannot
be virtues if separated from certain others. I shall only claim here that the
weaker form is true. Being amused at somebody's failure as a human being
could not exemplify a virtue 13 if that were the only attitude one had toward
her. But in the Christian personality a sense of humor is grammatically connected with other virtues such as compassion and hope. We can assume (I
hope) that Merton's amusement at Buggy Jerwood's confusion about cxYCX1tTJ
was suffused with that sense of common humanity and common dependence
on the grace of God that Christians call compassion; for if it wasn't, the
grammar of the Christian virtues declares that the amusement was not a
display of a Christian sense of humor. The grammatical connection, very
roughly and briefly, is that the kingdom which provides the perspective from
which certain behaviors and attitudes appear incongruous is the object of
Christian hope and the model of Christian compassion.
There would be something malicious or at any rate unacceptably frivolous
in the enjoyment of people's failures to achieve true humanity if that were
the end of the story-if, say, we believe that people are just fundamentally
screwed up and then die.
This would be tragedy, not comedy. But the Christian believes in an unspeakable future glory for God's creatures by comparison with which the
present defects of his children fade into insignificance. These "tragic" incongruities, which are the subject matter of Christian humor, are thus temporary,
and situated by Christian laughter in the larger context of God's mercy and
healing. It is because Christians are hopers that they can also be laughers
about the most serious things in life. In Flannery O'Connor's story Mrs.
Turpin does indeed end by having a "revelation" of the fundamental equality
of herself with all the humans she had scorned, and thus a foreshadowing of
her rebirth. So we can read the story as a symbol which says that if you're
going to laugh at the likes of Mrs. Turpin you'd better remember that you're
laughing at yourself too, and that to the enjoyment of laughter is to be added
the joy of hope in God that these incongruities, at any rate, are not eternal. 14
NOTES
1. See John Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany: State University of New
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York Press, 1983), and my response to his arguments, "Smiling With God: Reflections
on Christianity and the Psychology of Humor," Faith and Philosophy 4, 2: 168-175 (1987).
2. Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Volume 2, translated and edited by Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), § 1681.
3. It should have what I have called a "grammar" which determines its Christian
character. See my "Therapies and the Grammar of a Virtue" in Richard H. Bell (ed.), The
Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1988).
4. Readers of earlier drafts of this paper have repeatedly complained that while I perhaps
show some interesting connections between humor/amusement and the Christian life, I do
not show that a sense of humor can be a Christian virtue. I can start by saying that my
concept of a virtue is liberal. A virtue is a trait that makes a person a good specimen.
Traits that make people good as human beings are human virtues; traits that make them
good as moral beings are moral virtues; traits that make them good as Christians are
Christian virtues. Intelligence is a human virtue; when it is trained into moral discernment
it is a moral virtue; when it is trained into Christian discernment it is a Christian virtue.
The latter is a Christian virtue not just when it is joined to and in aid of the Christian life,
but because the discernment itself is shaped by the Christian story and its concepts. On
the other hand, I do think that some moral virtues are moral more or less only by
association with other virtues: e.g., courage is a moral virtue only when associated with
virtues such as justice and compassion, because courage can be used for immoral purposes.
To have a virtue is to meet some requirement of some ideal-of what it is to be human,
moral, Christian, or whatever. So I don't feel bound, in picking out virtues, to limit myself
to traits with official names-such as the Christian ones that occur in various lists in the
New Testament. (I do think, though, that most of the important ones have names.) My
concept of a virtue is liberal in another way. I reject a tendency in the literature to think
that to be a virtue a trait must meet certain requirements as to psychological type. It is
sometimes said that a virtue must be seated in the "wi11." This may mean a variety of
things. It may mean that virtues are the sort of dispositions that desires and aversions are.
Or it may mean that virtues are variants of our powers to choose courses of action. Either
of these conditions would seem to exclude a sense of humor as a virtue, but they also
neglect the fact that the good life is more than motive and action; it is also "vision."
Sometimes the claim that virtues are all determinants of the will is used to deny that any
virtues are skill-like capacities, as I take courage and self-control to be, or that such
personality-styles as friendliness and gentleness are virtues. Rather than accept these
exclusions, I prefer to deny or qualify the statement that all virtues are determinants of
the will. Aristotle claims that all virtues are dispositions to feel pleasure, and to experience
passions in just the right way. I have argued against such restrictions in some papers. See
"Will Power and the Virtues," Philosophical Review 93 (1984), 227-247, reprinted in R.
Kruschwitz and R. Roberts (eds.) The Virtues (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986) and
Christina Sommers (ed.) Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, second edition (Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1989), "Aristotle On Virtues and Emotions," Philosophical Studies,
55 (1989), 121-34 and "Virtues and Emotions" unpublished manuscript. In my view all
that it takes to show that a trait is a Christian virtue, is that it can be stable, draws on fairly
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central distinctive features of the Christian tradition, and makes a person better as a
Christian.
5. In English, 'amusement' sometimes refers to our state of mind of being happily
occupied in some interesting activity. Throughout this paper I use the word to denote only
the state of mind that occurs in response to humorous situations and presentations.
6. See Morreall, op. cit. In the present essay I have kept to a minimum the direct
discussion of my basic concepts (virtue, perception of incongruity, perspectivity, dissociation, etc.), in the interest of writing fairly economically about humor and amusement in
their Christian connections. For more on these concepts, see the other essays I refer to in
the notes, as well as my ~Humor and the Virtues," Inquiry 31, 2 (1988).
7. The Seven Storey Mountain (New York: Harcourt, 1948), p. 74.

8. For a discussion of this kind of mental event, which I call "construal," in the context
of a theory of emotion, see my ~What An Emotion Is: A Sketch," Philosophical Review
97 (April 1988). On differences and similarities between amusement and emotions, see
my ~Is Amusement An Emotion?," American Philosophical Quarterly 25,3 (July 1988).
9. More on the independence of amusement from beliefs can be found in section 2 of
"Humor and the Virtues," where I argue against Ronald de Sousa's claim that the
appreciation of e.g., sexist jokes requires believing propositions of sexist ideology.
10. As I argued in Spirituality and Human Emotion (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1983), chapter 4.
11. Flannery O'Connor, The Complete Stories (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
1971).
12. To be more precise about this, note that there are countless ways to be "amused by
O'Connor's story." A literary philistine might think the story poorly written, and laugh at
its pretensions to be literature. Another might laugh at what he takes to be the naughtiness
of the word 'nigger' in the mouths of some of the characters. None of this silliness would,
of co~e, be a participation in the Christian perspecti ve. So when I speak of being "amused
by O'Connor's story," I mean roughly "being amused by what O'Connor intends to amuse
us by in the story."
13. I responded, in endnote 4, to two grounds for doubting that a Christian sense of
humor is a Christian virtue: that it is not traditionally named among the Christian virtues,
and that it is not seated in the "will." My argument that it is a virtue because it is a fonn
of Christian "seeing," and because, when self-directed, it is a fonn of humility, may raise
a third objection. It may be said that while a Christian sense of humor is virtuous, I have
still not shown that it is a virtue; for, by my own admission, it is a fonn of other virtues,
namely Christian discernment and Christian humility. This objection raises the question
of how to individuate virtues, a question to which I do not have a general answer. But it
is clear that a Christian sense of humor is not identical with either Christian discernment
or Christian humility, or both. It is instead a form of each of these, and indeed an optional
fonn: a person could have a lot of discernment and humility without having much sense
of humor. Besides this, it seems to me distinctive enough to warrant status as a separate
virtue. If someone insists that it is not a virtue, but only a particular fonn that a couple of
other virtues can take, I shall not quibble. But I would point out that treating the "parts"
of virtues as virtues is not new: Aquinas distinguishes "principal" virtues from their
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"annexed" virtues, or "potential parts." For example, he treats gratitude and truthfulness
as "parts" of justice, and yet also as separate virtues. See Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 80.
14. This paper was written with support of a sabbatical leave from Wheaton College, a
grant from the Institute for Advanced Christian Studies, and the hospitality of the Institute
of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven. Criticisms of an earlier draft by
anonymous readers for Faith and Philosophy, and advice from William P. Alston, stimulated improvements in the paper. Thank you to all who provided these helps.

